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Abstract 
 
Identifying which website, Facebook page or Linked-in connection could lead to an engagement with a terrorist 
group is beyond the capabilities of ordinary people. Differentiation of one website from another in terms of 
cyber threat is a complex problem in terms of separating those that encourage and sponsor radicalization and 
those that do not. These claims usually exist without evidence, and almost always without the opportunity to 
know where social justice and human-rights support ends, and reaction, dissidence and subversion begins. By 
overlaying the new modes of governance (NMG) framework against sites and connections that may be subject to 
ongoing and persistent threats, sites can be divided into two areas. The first aligns closely with governance, 
whilst the second looks decidedly more threatening. This paper gives an outline for future developments in 
recognizing simple markers for differentiating hard core extremism from genuine community engagement. The 
notion that participatory governance need not imply democracy is an important element in future 
determinations between radically driven cyber threats and moderate media interactions. 
 
Keywords: Governance, participation, multi-scalar, radicalization, new modes of governance (NMG). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Within a research field that is constantly and repeatedly seeking to redefine the meaning of terrorism and 
security, it is surprising that there is no commensurate effort aimed at redefining governance. What is perhaps 
even more perplexing is why disciplines such as psychology, philosophy and politics continually adjust to novel 
understandings about politically-motivated violence yet make no real attempt to consider a new framework by 
which edicts, mandates and general order are established. Yet new modes of governance, largely based on non-
hierarchical structures and highly de-regulated arrangements, appear to be evolving at the root level of our 
governing principles.  Novel forms of communication and interaction, derived from e-governance, social 
networking, digital media and digital communications are now deemed to have permanent status within society.  
They all operate under very different governance to the rules of traditional law and order. Their regulating 
foundations are non-hierarchical, highly participatory, and adapt to different size and scale regardless of 
established governing bodies or formal authority.  This paper looks at the two areas of terrorism and governance 
and considers the way in which the latter can be used to interpret and make sense of the former.  With particular 
reference to forms of governance in Indonesia, and with a broad focus on its Islamic communities, this paper 
looks to encourage pragmatic perspectives about how governance operates.   
 
Two types of governance operate concurrently. Traditional governance follows vertically structured chains of 
command, and follows a set of rules and conventions that have been   developed over time using the authority of 
governments and regulatory bodies. Online communities, social networks and chat forums are far more closely 
linked to new modes of governance than the traditional hierarchy of government and/or religious authority. 
They derive their conventions through interaction and informational exchanges and dialogues. At face value, 
there is more than a passing connection between new online existences and the highly participatory non-
hierarchical characteristics of new modes of governance (NMG).  At a time when fake online personas and 
counterfeit web-content is indistinguishable as fact or fiction, the ability to depict preference for, and adoption 
of, this new type of governance may be useful in differentiating between the more nefarious elements of cyber 
threat from the mainstream interaction of moderate online citizens.  
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CONFUSION IN GOVERNANCE 
 
Governance is a misconstrued term. The term is used by governments to suggest ‘good’ government and to 
inherently embed the notion that vertically structured lines of authority represent the best method of establishing 
rule and order.  In contrast, social networks and web2.0 sites have greatly influenced the way in which 
individuals and organisations choose to behave. The governance of the internet shows far less connection with 
vertical authority and is remarkably devoid of connection with any particular government authority, with the 
possible exception of censored and filtered environments such as mainland China (Taubman 2001). Instead, 
‘netizens’ have made a bee-line for shared information and interaction across extremely robust forums and 
connections, yet without the established rules and hierarchies of other more face to face environments (Budd & 
Harris, 2009).  In reaction to this phenomenon security researchers refer to the ‘global dialectic’ by cautioning 
about the world wide conditions under which awakening, awareness, activism and radicalism are stimulated 
within small local circles that quickly generate widespread involvement, dissent and protest (RAND, 2000).  
Web 2.0 environments are extremely attractive to those engaged in cyber menace because in addition to the 
obvious ubiquity and speed of delivery, any interaction enjoys numerous options in ensuring the capability to 
circumvent government censorship (Denning 2000).  Clearly the governance of traditional hierarchy and state-
based authority has little effect against the tidal-wave of cyber threats. 
 
Social networks look irresistibly tempting to those who advocate global forms of governance. Proponents of 
global governance are advocates of a hybrid existence in terms of governance. They recognise the fallibilities 
with state-based and regional/local regulation and authority in online terms. However, they still cling to the 
traditional vertical hierarchies of face to face governance even though they hold no sway in any virtual sense. 
The natural allure of trans-border interaction within a global community appears, at first glance, attractive to 
globalists interested in governance. However social networking is not such a perfect fit as one might presume. 
Global governance refers to global problem-solving arrangements in far more concrete terms than the sorts of 
free-flowing discussions that take place in social networks. The very same detachment from individual nation 
states and discrete governments is also a freedom from other hierarchies as well. In fact, social networks often 
promote lawless freedoms without any dissimilarity between government, NGO, private sector or civil society.  
Global governance is frequently trundled out in a predetermined fashion to its global village constituents. 
Although dynamic participants in social networks laud their associations and freedoms of speech they are also 
collectively harsh and swift to criticize any actor (state, individual or global) who suggests that one particular set 
of rules has already been determined and that global society need simply comply. Advocates of a disaggregated 
sovereignty should remember that social networks rise up to problems more vehemently than they do to 
solutions (Weimann, 2007: 211).  
 
A step further along the evolutionary governance chain supports the notion that e-Governance and IT 
governance might also feel comfortable in the midst of a citizenry of social network advocates.  IT governance 
takes a parallel direction to global governance, insomuch as it actively contributes to the same initial sanguine 
beliefs about the efficacy and viability of governance within social networks.  However IT governance is 
afflicted by a similar disadvantage to global governance because it relies upon the competence of information 
delivery in combination with a robust interdependence with knowledge management. Its reliance upon 
competent bureaucracy precipitates a corresponding reduction in pliability, creativity and ingenuity.  Yet the 
sort of real world governance that governments support also serve to stifle the naturally unfettered vision and 
enterprise which characterises so much about the appeal of online interaction. There is a flawed underlying 
supposition that e-Governance will somehow overcome these problems automatically.  Vincent and Harris 
(2009) explain the drawback of widespread technology acquisition that just because a modern communications-
technology becomes more readily procurable, “it does not necessarily follow that people will be prepared to 
change their established practices…to interact with government” (ibid :38).  At least part of that inventive 
freedom pertains to a liberation from traditional forms of governance.  
 
One of the galvanising arguments with the debate about the governance of social networks is whether there is 
any significant authority which we can depend on.  The dominant issues comprise trust, negotiation, diplomacy, 
and citizenship. This is often measured by considering perceived levels of diffusion (Budd and Harris, 2009), 
however despite the ubiquity of social networks, the conditions do not as yet exist under which an acceptable 
level of trust and mediation act as genuine enablers of governance. Social networks occupy a position at the 
broadest end of the diffusion space.  That means that whilst social networks offer a rich source of widespread 
opinion, they are also subject to criticism from governance practitioners who place a much heavier weighting on 
issues of clarity and trust. Figure 1. illustrates the notion of a diffused acceptance of e-governance in society.  
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Figure 1. Dimensional Diffusion for Online Governance, Trust, and Authority 
 
 
 
Perceived Levels of Diffusion Levels of Trust (Perspectives) 
 
 The Global Village    High level trust and reliability within known parameters 
 
The Knowledge Economy     Medium to High level trust 
 
The Wired Nation       Medium Trust - some ambiguity 
 
The Empowered Community      Social acceptance / popularity 
 
The Learning Organisation        Popularity based guess 
 
The Informed Individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic Democracy and e-Government (e-Democracy) 
 
    Electronic Business (e-Business) 
 
   Social Networks through (Commercial entities like Facebook, My Space, Friendster) 
 
  Chat Forums and private online discussions 
 
 Governance and strength of Authority (Aspects) 
Adapted from Okot-Uma (2000) 
 
 
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
 
The term hard governance ‘sounds’ more robust than soft governance. Proponents of governance often seek to 
demonstrate the success of key governance features and therefore opt for more concrete rules-based forms of 
governance because they have quantifiable metrics that can be presented as measures of success. Hierarchical 
structures can demonstrate project governance in the form of deadlines, milestones, and deliverables. In the real 
world of commercially difficult (and value-laden) enterprise, hard governance is far less effective than its softer 
cousin. Global governance, e-government and IT governance derive their success from the proposition that a 
rule has been adhered to, or a date has been met. These successes are meaningful in corporate terms, and often 
underpin the ability to achieve large-scale profits for companies, businesses, individuals and collaborative 
ventures. They may even assist in achieving a range of social goals like decreasing road deaths, paying licenses 
and taxation returns. However when used to bring about solutions, mitigations and the avoidance of complex 
issues, softer forms of governance are better suited. 
 
In areas where discussions take place between people who have been marginalized, downtrodden, and exploited, 
the achievement of a corporate deadline becomes meaningless.  Such is the case through much of South-east 
Asia. In nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines, the lack of participatory governance creates a ‘hotbed’ of 
dissent where multi-national corporations locate major ventures in order to take advantage of low cost 
operations (Lewis 2007, p206).  Even worse, in the case of disparities so great that they involve people 
convinced of the need for strong violent actions, a corporate rule or hierarchical framework may in fact be a 
contributing factor in convincing an individual or group to commit an act of retaliation or retribution. The aim of 
participatory governance is not about a measurable financially-dependent outcome. Rather, the aim of 
participatory governance is to provide circumstances where the rules and structures (or perhaps the removal of 
them) can be influenced and shaped by a range of interactions. Although participatory governance is often 
tagged as ‘soft’ governance, the label is a misnomer. Participatory governance deserves a tag more closely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
suggestive of ‘complex’ or ‘multi-factorial’ governance.  It can draw together multiple points of contention that 
move it beyond the limitations of single issue rules and ordinance. 
 
In social networking, the discussions range from the mundane to the sensational.  Chat rooms abound with 
discussions about ordinary elements of life. Mixed in with conversations about ordinary matters are multifaceted 
discussions from a diverse range of outlooks, beliefs and values. Catastrophic events that affect global opinion 
(such as the war on terror) generate widespread popular discussion fields that are mostly polarized, and often 
reactionary to events and circumstances. Social networking allows civilian interaction that engages less in 
technological determinism and more in social determinism by influencing a range of factors from culture and 
politics through to economic partnerships and shared regulatory mechanisms. “What matters is not the 
technology itself, but the social or economic system in which it is embedded” (Winner 2004, p106). Again, from 
a South-east Asian perspective, the cultural and political authority of the region is easily identifiable through the 
way in which activists evade government censorship and embrace the participatory allure of social networking 
(Weimann 2007, P214). 
 
Participatory governance is the backbone of interactive social networking. It is sometimes described as weak 
governance or soft governance, because it lacks the same hierarchical authority structures of its corporate and 
governmental cousins. In certain terms the ‘soft’ label is a deserved label. Why involve the many when 
decisions can be made with clarity and efficiency by a few? Why involve additional ideas that could open up 
unnecessary discussions fuel wider debate, and add unnecessary inertia to an already inefficient set of 
processes? These are the arguments of business, of corporations and in many instances of governments 
(regardless of democratic status or otherwise). The regulatory reactions of governments to the events of 
September 11 2001 were hard-edged, swift and authoritarian (Hoffman 2006). They pigeonholed activities by 
single-issue laws and ‘fit for purpose’ rules as matters of security and protection.  Difficult times called for hard 
measures, including the calcification of governance (Lewis 2007, p222). In South-east Asian countries such as 
Indonesia, there is a greater need for participatory governance to balance the hierarchical authority of elite and 
semi-authoritarian rule. The real value of participatory governance, however, is not in the softness of its 
interactions, but rather it is the complexity and richness of the multi-faceted opinions which are drawn into play. 
 
MEDIA, IMAGERY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
Mainstream media interaction is a strange bedfellow to social networking. On the one hand most media draws 
attention from a wide range of highly visual and remarkably graphic communication offerings whilst on the 
other hand social networking draws its greatest impact from an acceptance of the new way in which communal 
ties and opinions are composed, posted, and discussed. Since many of the contributing links to the overall 
composition of a social network are at best loose connections, a dominant issue could effectively attract a great 
many loose ties or only a handful of stronger ties. Connections might be long-standing or momentary, yet they 
all count towards the wider ‘community’ that is accepted under the banner of social networking.  
 
There is widespread Indonesian mistrust in sophisticated media because of its historical Western origins and the 
thought of being overwhelmed by all things Hollywood.  Whilst editorial authority is usually assigned to the 
pro-establishment, capitalist elite, many revolutionaries have assumed that their communications would always 
be moderated, misinterpreted, or seized upon for its ‘entertainment’ benefit rather than its informative and 
educational objectives (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). The counterargument must acknowledge that  people from 
southeast Asia have a fascination for new media (that goes beyond most Western interests) and are drawn to 
social networks like moths to a flame. One critical component in determining the shape and depth of each online 
community is the acceptance, or otherwise, of its participatory governance. Social networks exist within popular 
frameworks by incorporating a range of accompanying visual imagery. To simply discuss social networks as if 
they only participate within the context of text-based discussions is misleading. Social networks are limited by 
the way they offer a loosely egalitarian basis for participation. Social networks, when examined in combination 
with their accompanying imagery (photos, youtube videos etc), favor the technologically advanced participant.  
 
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE 
 
Democracy and governance have been lumped together as co-dependent requirements of an applied solution to 
radicalization. However this alignment is partially flawed. Islamic groups from both ends of the political 
violence spectrum have not supported democracy and in fact use the term as a pejorative in the context of the 
war on terror. US policy continually takes the path of polarizing certain elements of community interaction by 
insisting that good governance can only come from democracy, and therefore governance without democracy is 
not good. Governance can be expressed through participation without an expressed connection to democracy. 
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Western democratically aligned ‘netizens’ might assume that all participants in any given social network 
support democracy but this is over-simplifying democracy into the participatory side of its characteristics.  
 
The intention of this paper is not to challenge the successful integration of democratic process across developing 
communities, but rather to ensure that democracy does not become an exclusionary term that prevents non-
democratic communities and individuals from engaging in forms of participatory governance. Governance, like 
democracy, surfaces from under a range of highly contested circumstances. Social networks enjoy the patronage 
of individuals without asking their political, ideological or religious predispositions. The anonymity or partial 
masking of identities among social network participants is one of the key features of its structure in terms of 
governance. Social network participants are, for the most part, free to post comment and enter discussions, chats 
and arguments on an equal basis. The same could certainly not be said for face to face discussions on the same 
topics.  E-participants can reveal as much or as little as they want. They need not reveal gender, race, or 
ideology. 
 
In Indonesia there is enormously widespread support for Islam and in many cases that extends to the Islamic 
governance of Islam and its fundamental rules, beliefs and values. At the harder end of the Islamic governance 
spectrum there is considerable support for Sharia Law (Ramakrishna 2009). Yet from the same community there 
is also widespread engagement in the more moderate participatory conversations, postings and commentaries 
that comprise the social networks of south-east Asia. To imply that these interactions are democracy has at least 
two significantly deleterious effects. Firstly it influences the wider Islamic community of Indonesia towards a 
deeper rejection of what is often perceived as the decadent and evil trappings of western society. Secondly, it 
serves to polarize the wrong features of what are key discussions about difficult issues. In essence, the best 
participants are those who engage in online discussion or website postings regardless of their views about 
western democracy. For many individuals and groups who come from marginalized and downtrodden origins, it 
is an important distinction that they be included in the participatory elements of online discussions without the 
fear of being branded as participants in democracy.   
 
The democracy issue is relevant because it is strongly linked to the governance debate about whether we can 
encourage communities to embrace governance without embracing (or believing they are embracing) 
democracy. In the case of Indonesia, there is a clear pattern of participation and engagement in social networks 
that indicates a willingness to discuss matters that are plainly contested and unmistakably difficult to resolve 
within a Muslim-dominated society. After episodes such as the Marriott hotel bombings in Jakarta, the Bali 
Bombings (I and II), and post events such as the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (Ramakrishna 
2009), social networks throughout Indonesia have revealed a large volume of post-incident discussion in 
general, of which sufficient numbers of social participants support the theory that social networks sustain 
participation in such dialogues (Robb 2007). 
 
Western contributors often assume that democracy is a necessary element of any discussion about governance. 
Even though there is widespread acceptance of the merits of participation, feedback, interaction, and social 
inclusion, the requirement for elected representation does not share the same affirmation in south-east Asia (Loo 
2007). Elected representation is held aloft as the crowning feature of democracy (ibid).  However for those 
whose origins lie in the marginalized and uprooted regions of the world, the appeal, trust, and perceived 
legitimacy of democracy is less accepted. Whilst western cultures slam democracy and participatory governance 
together as part of the same ideal, non-western cultures maintain their support for various forms of governance 
without the connection with democracy (UNDP, 2005). 
 
THE “DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” 
 
Despite not supporting western democracy, an understanding of participatory governance within south-east 
Asian communities still needs to focus on a better understanding of democratic values. Past discourse regarding 
democratic values have often oversimplified democracy as an all-conquering solution. However, online internet-
savvy participants are more accurately informed about democracy than ever before. The “democratic deficit” is 
a phrase that enters discussions about governance on a regular basis. It refers to those ostensibly democratic 
associations (especially governments) that appear to be decreasing their achievements in upholding the 
principles of parliamentary democracy (Budd and Harris, 2009).  Their conduct as representatives and their 
achievements in terms of parliamentary integrity are the topic of widespread social network discussion. Within 
the Indonesian social network environment, the democratic deficit is a topic that is discussed with a great deal of 
maturity (Ramakrishna 2009:87). There is a wider understanding of the deficit in the European Union, and a 
corresponding understanding of a relative ‘surplus’ in terms of democratic comparisons to organizations such as 
the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Nation-states that have endured the 
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generosity and favor of global NGOs have a razor-sharp clarity about issues of governance and funds and 
assistance from NGOs. Democratically punctuated governance does not have a perfectly clean slate in terms of 
global aid and assistance and the mechanisms by which certain hierarchical elites maintain a globally perceived 
unfair advantage.   
 
NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
This discussion has so far indicated general support for participatory governance. However participatory 
governance is a clumsy descriptor for the type of high-yield governance that is put forward in this paper.  New 
Modes of Governance (NMG) refers to more than just examples of rules.  The links between social media and 
governance are clearly evident when examined through a framework of decentralized inter-sectoral networks. 
New modes of governance are characterized by a complex version of governance than that of publicly discussed 
and privately enacted market-driven transparency (Sassen, 2003; Walters, 2004). 
 
Understanding New Modes of Governance (NMG) requires changing the accepted wisdom about what 
governance is. In the first instance, NMG sees government as a single branch of governance, and not the other 
way around. Governance is a multi-layered authority that derives its legitimacy from a multifaceted set of 
exchanges rather than any one single focused point of power. (Walters,2004). Under this more complex 
arrangement NMG exhibits multi-scalar characteristics that appear as self-regulating cross-boundary systems. 
The NMG structures follow directional traits that are more aligned with ‘’steering’ than ‘rowing’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992). This form of policy ‘steering’ is typically non-hierarchical and shows as a diminished hierarchy. 
It has often been further defined as having the effect of ‘hollowing the state’ (Rhodes, 1996).  These features 
(more than simple participation) are continually exhibited across social networks. (Jessop, 1997) 
Scale, Shape and Boundaries 
 
New Modes of Governance are notably multi-scalar. By comparison, the traditional hierarchies of nation-state 
governance operate within a set of specified ranges.  Large scale enterprises usually interact with similarly sized 
entities, whilst individual operators gravitate towards interactions with other individuals.  Those who embrace 
NMG are drawn to it because of its ability to ignore scale as an issue (Latham and Sassen, 2005). The more 
diverse the various actors are within the field of engagement, the greater the expectation that the value of the 
participation will be rich.  In the context of social networks accessed by radicals, the compelling feature of new 
modes of governance is that any given discussion can adapt to interactions across global and local elements. No 
one single issue becomes overshadowed by global rhetoric. Instead, the focus remains interconnected with local 
issues of any magnitude.  Under these conditions governance gains a meaningful foothold across social network 
users irrespective of organisational status, size or sphere of influence.  (Kooiman, 1993) 
 
Sassen (2003) advocates NMG because of its application in different notions of authority. New modes have an 
empowering quality that encourages natural leadership qualities. The participants of on-line chat conversations 
through popular social media come and go according to personal preference and personal satisfaction. No one 
actor dominates a discussion, and any and all actors can come and go as they wish. NMG does not recognize 
state-based boundaries and borders.  In some cases that means there is an intersection between public and 
private organisations or individuals and large groups.  At other levels it means there is interaction between 
individuals who are simply sharing the governance of commonly discussed values and issues.  Unlike 
hierarchical structures that often force an unwilling response (especially in relation to rules that are born out of 
one particular value system), new modes fosters ongoing interaction between like and unlike minded actors.   
These interactions are of varying scale, authority, participation and outcome. 
 
STEERING NOT ROWING 
 
New modes of governance appear more naturally in social networks than in other environments. Rhodes (1996) 
points to two main features in ICT and digital environments. Socio-cybernetic systems and self-organising 
networks are two key features of new modes of governance that evolve because social networks have few of the 
hierarchical constraints of other organisational groupings. Both fit snugly into the ubiquitous boundaries of 
social networks.  For Rhodes this is the true value of the NMG opportunity that he refers to as “governing 
without government (Rhodes 1996: 667).  
 
In most face to face networks and organisations the differences, disparities and asymmetries of its contributing 
actors are more clearly defined through obvious signs and physical manifestations. Each actor knows something 
of the others and enters into discussions and information sharing based upon those specific understandings. 
NMG in social networks masks these distinctions. What follows then is a self-organising approach to 
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commentary and debate that drives discussions. No single actor dominates - so the nature of the “steered course” 
is a function of the combined comments and thoughts that emerge through the social network.  “The issue of 
whether someone lives in a centre or on the periphery of a social system is determined less by his or her place of 
residence but rather by the intensity and the connections of his or her communications” (Paetau 2003, p30).  
 
Steering rather than rowing is an important characteristic of NMG in social networks. For genuine influence to 
curb the curiosity of potential radicals that guidance (steering) must occur organically through participation that 
is free from politically biased hierarchical structure. A collective guidance emerges within social networks 
which is informal in origin, yet takes on a legitimacy that is substantially more robust than any of its individual 
contributing commentators. “Steering” assumes even greater legitimacy because its direction is constantly under 
review and, where necessary, correction. More formal forms of governance plot a course and then maintain that 
course. NMG is open to the active reconsideration of values and beliefs according to circumstance and 
happenstance.       
 
Human rights groups, NGOs and radical Islamic groups all draw their members form a common pool of 
ordinary citizens (Weimann, 2006).  New Modes of Governance might better be understood to work at the edges 
of difficult issues rather than from a direct attempt to denounce and destroy the central core of radical impulse 
through some sort of ‘divine’ democratic understanding.  NMG works most effectively when it is applied to 
complex issues. Understanding why terrorist radicalization gains such strong traction amongst the marginalised 
and downtrodden is a complex problem. If those who share a predisposition towards nominally accepting a path 
of radical Islam can never understand the value of democratically evolved values then why not approach the 
same people in a manner of interaction that still covets governance without the unattractive elements of 
mainstream democracy. A discussion played out through a social network on an issue such as the killing of 
innocent bystanders during Jihad can have tremendous impact across a wide audience (or a select few), where 
that same discussion could otherwise never hope or expect to infiltrate the inner core of radical groups.  
 
Social networks facilitate participation at the most useful level of inclusion amongst the most keenly sought 
actors involved in Islamic communities. To engage with the undecided, or the partially convinced is of 
tremendous value in the fight against terrorism.  To maintain a range of meaningful discourses that are no longer 
dismissed outright from consideration is even more valuable. At the same time, NMG also enables terrorists to 
perform what Denning (1999) describes as ‘Perception Management’ by allowing radicals to portray themselves 
and their actions in whatever way they wish, outside the filters and sanitation of established media. The New 
Modes of Governance appeal to wider audiences has several advantages that suggest that governance has a 
broad attraction.  
 
GOVERNANCE MARKERS IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
Social networks attract comments and postings from any and all actors regardless of disposition to radical 
terrorism. For many critics of open source discussion there is a fear that people would be seduced by radicals 
who would stalk and prey on those who might be vulnerable to a consideration of Islamic radicalization. The use 
of governance, and in particular the application of new modes of governance, is therefore beneficial in 
determining which social networks, which websites, which chat rooms and which specific associations support 
the kinds of interactions that draw out the more complex aspects of terrorism and radicalization. 
 
DEPLOYING NEW MODES TO ACT AS MARKERS 
 
Given the close fit between NMG and social networks, it is possible to make determinations about specific 
social networks to assist in deciding the interactivity of a given site, chat-room, or discussion thread. There are 
obvious websites that do not need such an evaluation in order to determine their standing.  Some websites use 
clear language in describing their support for radical Islam by precluding open ended discussions about radical 
Islam, and by preventing the opportunity for such discussions (Weimann, 2006). These type of sites fall well 
outside the catchment of new modes of participation. Sites such as these either offer no options for the posting 
of comments or discussion threads, or otherwise moderate the comments so heavily that truly interactive and 
transparent participation cannot and does not take place.  “Participation is an active process; individuals seek 
and select the [chat]rooms most compatible with their views and abandon the ones they disagree 
with”(Sageman, 2008, p117) 
 
The main characteristics of new modes of governance form the basis of key ‘markers’ that indicate the manner 
in which participation plays out.  These markers help to identify rogue participants by highlighting an actor 
whose intentions might be to derail a thread or unduly influence an online discussion (Brachman, 2009). In other 
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cases the same markers assist in revealing the radical nature of a website or social grouping.  Social networks 
aligned to radical recruitment sites often feature predatory online chat tactics that attempt to drag a participant 
away from the openly transparent threads that initially entice participation and discussion towards more 
controlled environments where governance takes a back seat to political and ideological motives. In recent times 
an emerging threat to social networking has been the tactic of creating ‘parasite’ takeovers of sites and networks 
that originally began under entirely more innocent origins (Weimann, 2006).  Other less subtle markers include 
the links to fundraising and the requests for financial support of a “global jihad”. Some sites have links to 
hidden recruitment and fundraising sites with complementary links to social media including Facebook and 
other popular social environments (Hoffman, 2006).   
 
Markers such as these are important tools in the fight to differentiate legitimate social networking from cyber-
predation. Sageman (2008, p114), highlights the misunderstanding between websites that release information 
about jihad and the far more dangerous social network sites that go beyond information and into active 
recruitment of young believers through computer-mediated chatrooms and forums.  
 
Markers for NMG and non-participatory deception 
 
 Is the process of posting comments and/or chatting on-line seamless and    transparent? 
 Does each posting allow for anonymity? 
 Can any one participant unduly exert influence or visible status? 
 Does the social network allow and or encourage “steering” that is dynamic across a range of issues and 
contested discussions? 
 Do certain chats and threads suddenly disappear off mainstream and into private “chat-realms” 
 Is moderation unevenly harsh and swift towards comments without explanation or acknowledgement of 
concern? 
 Do any of the comments or posts become dominating rants that appear to badger earnest discussion? 
 Can the scale or size of any particular contributor become obvious so as to exert an influence over other 
contributors? 
 Do global issues get a strong showing without connection or context to local and regional concerns? 
 Does the discussion continually call for religious or political reasoning? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
New modes of governance provide a method by which social networks can more easily be distinguished.  Whilst 
the term government is often used abstractly as a synonym for governance, it is the concept of governance rather 
than its application of rules that is directly connected to social networking and media. Islamism clearly rejects 
democracy. The broader community of Islam tolerates the notion that democracy exists but prefers an 
‘Islamically-palatable’ type of governance that does not insist on elected representation. The indicator of choice 
is therefore one which is capable of interpreting which social networks incorporate NMG steering characteristics 
whilst embracing high participation irrespective of hierarchy, asymmetry, or singularly dominant influence 
(Bevir, 2009).  New modes of governance provide the building blocks for two key initiatives regarding online 
radicalization.  They offer a better understanding of which social networks, which chat rooms, and which 
discussion threads are closely aligned to acceptable modes of governance. Secondly they enhance the conditions 
under which radically motivated actors can better participate amongst non-radical discussions so that radicalism 
is evaluated against a wide body of opinion.  This early research indicates the need for further evaluation of new 
modes of governance as an effective method of identifying cyber threats within social networks. 
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